Random Passphrase Generator
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Estimate — attacker knows the method; offline attack at 10 billion guesses/sec.
How this estimate works
Entropy = number of words × log₂(1296) ≈ words × 10.34 bits, because each word is a uniform random pick from the EFF Short Word List 2.0 (1296 words). Capitalizing one random word adds log₂(word count) bits — the attacker must also guess which word was capitalized. Crack time = 2entropy ÷ 10,000,000,000 guesses per second.
We assume the attacker knows the method (Kerckhoffs's principle) — the worst case. Most real attackers don't know your method, so your actual resistance is usually higher. We show the pessimistic number on purpose; judge it with eyes open.
Quick reference
- 3 words — ≈31 bits. Weak against offline attacks; avoid for important accounts.
- 5 words — ≈51.7 bits. Fine for everyday accounts.
- 6+ words — ≈62+ bits. For high-value accounts (email, password manager).
FAQ
Why are random passphrases strong?
Each word is a uniform random pick from 1296 words, so every word adds ≈10.3 bits of entropy: a 5-word passphrase has about 51.7 bits — roughly 3.7 quadrillion combinations. The strength comes from the randomness of the picks, which a computer does far better than a human. Don't invent words yourself — human "randomness" is predictable.
Why does the crack-time estimate look so short?
It assumes the attacker already knows exactly how you generated the passphrase and brute-forces that known space offline at 10 billion guesses per second — the worst case. Real attackers usually start with common-password dictionaries and don't know your method, so real-world resistance is typically much higher. We report the pessimistic number so you can judge for yourself.
How many words should I use?
5 words (≈51.7 bits) is fine for everyday accounts. Use 6 or more (≈62+ bits, ~15+ years of worst-case offline brute force) for high-value accounts like email or your password manager. 3 words is weak against a determined offline attack.
What does "capitalize one random word" change?
It adds log₂(word count) bits — about 2.3 bits for 5 words — because an attacker who knows the method must also guess which word was capitalized. Small but real, and it helps satisfy "must contain an uppercase letter" password rules.
Is this estimate a guarantee?
No — it is an estimate from a fixed, documented model. Real attackers may be weaker (they don't know your method) or stronger (targeted phishing, malware). Treat it as a transparent benchmark, not a promise.
Does this site see my passphrase?
No. There is no backend and no network requests. Words are drawn with the browser's
cryptographic random generator (crypto.getRandomValues) and everything happens inside
this page. Refresh the page and the passphrase is gone.